This study examines the effect of government health care and education programs on the poor in Chile from 2000 to 2006. Results are obtained from a country-wide provincial level panel data-set with information on poverty and indigence head-count ratios, measures on the severity of poverty as captured by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke P 2 value, per capita public expenditures on health and education, as well as other variables that are thought to influence well-being. We use fixed-effects techniques to correct for time-invariant province-specific characteristics that may affect program placement. Our analysis demonstrates that per capita public health and education expenditures significantly reduce the incidence of poverty and indigence in Chile. In particular, for a 10,000 pesos (about $23) increase in provincial per capita health and education spending, the poverty head-count ratio decreases by 0.48% and 0.73%, respectively. Per capita education expenditures are especially critical to reducing the severity of poverty. Our results indicate that for a 10,000 pesos increase in education spending, the severity of poverty declines by as much as 1.53%. Furthermore, we provide evidence that public spending in Chile is nonrandom. In particular, government education expenditures may be allocated in keeping with compensatory motives.
Section 1: Introduction
The Chilean governments of the 1990s and 2000s have focused heavily on poverty eradication as part of their development strategy. Much of the investment in socioeconomic development has been financed from Chile's economic growth, and many of the targets have been in accordance with the World Bank's Millennium Development Goals. By 2015, Chile hopes to reduce the percentage of its citizens living in absolute poverty (widely measured as those earning less than one dollar per day) to 1.7% from 3.5% in 1990, as well as continue to reduce poverty rates beyond the 50% reduction that has already occurred since 1990 (Gobierno de Chile 2005a). However, it is not easy to enact public spending policies to meet these targets. This is because given resource scarcities in developing countries, finding capital to finance projects can be difficult. Determining whether government spending can reduce poverty in Chile is of use to policy-makers in targeting investments effectively. This is the aim of our research.
In this study, we investigate changes in poverty in Chile in recent years, and in particular, the role of public spending (on health care and education) in reducing poverty. The health care and education investments we analyze affect poverty and indigence (extreme poverty) by increasing human capital investments, and by equipping individuals with the means to secure better income-earning opportunities. Health care and education investments complement one another. As Contreras and Larrañaga (2001) suggests, insufficient income (poverty) may be due to a lack of income-generating assets, as well as to a low return on the assets already possessed.
Human capital, broadly defined as the stock of productive capacities and knowledge of an individual, is the main asset associated with income-earning potential. Health and education investments increment human capital and therefore have direct results on poverty reduction.
Furthermore, as noted in Helwege (1995) , such investments engage the economy in a virtuous cycle, whereby greater social equality stimulates economic growth crucial for future reductions in poverty. By studying public health and education expenditures, this research sheds light on an important avenue for poverty reduction in Chile.
Our empirical evaluation of provincial data from Chile reveals that public spending has strong mitigating effects on poverty and indigence. Correcting for the endogeneity of program placement using fixed-effects (FE) techniques, we find that regions that have received more per capita social expenditures in health care and education are associated with lower levels of poverty and indigence. Our estimates indicate that for a 10,000 pesos (about $23) increase in provincial per capita health and education spending, the poverty head-count ratio decreases by 0.48% and 0.73%, respectively. Furthermore, per capita education expenditures are found to have an ameliorating effect on indigence. Results indicate that for a 10,000 pesos increase in education spending, the severity of poverty declines by as much as 1.53%.
In order to highlight the bias that results from ignoring the non-random nature of program placement, we estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) models that treat programs exogenously. A comparison of the OLS and FE estimates clearly shows the bias in the former set of results.
Moreover, we undertake a joint estimation of program impacts since correlation matrices reveal that program placement tends to be clustered. Finally, we evaluate the "rules" that the government uses in allocating public programs at the regional level. This evaluation confirms that government programs are not allocated randomly; in particular, regions with poor latent endowments are more likely to receive compensatory investments in health and education.
Section 2: Previous Research and Facts about Poverty and Public Spending in Chile
Poverty reduction in Chile has been significant, particularly in relative terms. Previous literature suggests that throughout the 1990s, the percent of the Chilean population living in poverty fell drastically from 26% to 15% (see figure 1), while Latin America as a whole experienced a much smaller reduction in overall poverty (from 48% to 44%). This decline in poverty rates may be attributed to several factors including Chile's high annual GDP growth rate of 6.1%, reduction in inflation by more than 23%, and the 8% average annual growth rate of total social public expenditures between 1990 and 2000 (Foxley 2004 ). Although economists have stressed the importance of macroeconomic factors such as the high rate of economic growth in Chile's development success, microeconomic factors such as per capita increases in social spending have also been beneficial for Chile's poor.
A brief history of economic growth and public spending in Chile is useful in setting the context for this research. Chile's sustained growth during the 1990s can be attributed to the social investments of the Concertación 1 . After the seventeen-year reign (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, the succeeding governments of Patrico Aylwin (1990 Aylwin ( -1994 and Eduardo Frei (1994 Frei ( -2000 focused heavily on increasing social expenditure. Spending on social programs more than doubled in real terms between 1989 and 1997. In this time period, health and education investments (mostly ignored under Pinochet) increased by 179.3% and 115%, respectively (Weyland 1999) . In fact, during Pinochet's military regime, not a single new hospital was built. The succeeding democratic governments of the Concertación took great efforts to correct this by investing in hospitals, housing, education, and pension reform. Much of the increase in public spending was financed by the 1990 tax reforms, as well as the increased government revenues from high levels of exports and economic growth. Weyland (1999) underlines the importance of social spending by noting that each percentage point of economic growth contributed 50% more towards reducing poverty under the Concertación from 1990 to 1996 (with high levels of social expenditure), than under the military regime from 1987 to 1990
1 The Concertación, or officially the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), is an alliance of left-center political parties in Chile that has won all presidential elections since 1990.
(with low levels of social expenditures). Moreover, even when GDP growth fell from 6.6% in 1997 to -1.1% in 1999, poverty rates continued to decline. This is primarily because the yearly growth rate of social expenditures rose from 5.6% to 7.8% of GDP during this time period.
These numbers indicate that social spending plays a key role in poverty reduction.
Information on provincial-level determinants of government spending in Chile is limited.
However, as expected, at the country level, social programs have been targeted towards the poor.
This has mainly been with a view to reducing overall income inequality rather than poverty alleviation per se. These social programs include expenditures on pensions, housing, health, and education. Health expenditures in the late 1990s, in particular, have been found to reduce inequality (World Bank 1997).
Reductions in income inequality depend on identification of the poor, and the standard identifier of poor households in Chile is the "CAS-2 Card" which households request. The CAS-2 Card judges the poverty status of households based on their self-reported income and housing measures -in particular, construction materials used, and access to drinking water (Agostini and Brown 2007) . The household is assigned a score which remains valid for three years. Five types of government subsidies are provided to poor households based on the CAS-2 card. These include the family subsidy, the assistance pensions, Chile Solidario, water and sewage subsidy, and unemployment subsidies. (Pitt et al. 1993 ). Taking such considerations into account is important in accurately assessing the effect of public spending on poverty.
Several studies have examined the link between government expenditures and poverty reduction (Lipton and Ravallion 1995; Datt and Ravallion 1997; Castro-Leal, Dayton, Demery, and Mehra 1999; Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 2000; Yao 2000; and Foxley 2004) . The majority of these investigations have adopted a macroeconomic perspective, considering the impact of investments and current spending on the poor in both the agricultural and non-farm sectors.
Macroeconomic growth, defined simply as rise in a country's gross domestic product (GDP), has been thought to be the main tool for fighting poverty. In this vein, studies of Chilean poverty reduction since 1990 have focused on the overall success of the rapid economic growth that
Chile experienced in the last two decades. One empirical study comparing social policies in
Chile shows that roughly 60% of the poverty reduction throughout the 1990s can be attributed to economic growth; another study from 1987 to 1996 finds that this number could be as high as 85% (Foxley 2004; Attanasio and Székely 2001) .
Although economic growth has been important in ameliorating poverty in Chile, suggests that social policies have also played an important role.
Moreover, in addition to reducing poverty, indicates that social policies in
Chile have had positive spillover effects in reducing income inequality as well. 4 By imputing income transfers for government subsidies in health, education, and housing, indicates that the Gini coefficient in 1998 fell from 0.56 to 0.50. The study concludes that the impact of social spending improved over the 1990s, primarily because of increases in budgetary allocations to government programs over that time-span.
Despite the recognition that social expenditures are critically important for eradicating poverty and for improving income inequality, relatively few studies have investigated the microeconomic impact of social spending in Chile. Furthermore, existing research suggests (but does not correct for the fact) that the placement of programs financed by the government of Chile may occur in a systematic, non-random fashion. In an analysis of policies that affect competition in Chile, Galetovic (2007) argues that the central government enjoys a wide mandate in deciding the implementation of laws that affect a large variety of things (taxes, environmental policies, labor policies, and regulatory standards). Given this, it is likely that public spending on health and education also occurs at the government's discretion. As noted above, this implies that evaluation exercises in which programs are treated exogenously provide biased results.
This research contributes to the literature in two ways. First, using micro-data from Chile, this study employs fixed-effects techniques to correct for endogeneity in program placement in evaluating the impact of public programs. This is an improvement on previous work that has, for the most part, largely ignored the presence of area specific heterogeneity which may bias results. Second, we study government "location rules" that may determine the distribution of publicly-financed programs. We confirm that government spending occurs in a non-random fashion since per capita education expenditures are found to be allocated in a compensatory manner. By undertaking a disaggregate study of the effects of public spending in
Chile that conditions on the non-randomness of program placement, and by evaluating rules that may govern the distribution of public programs, this research addresses a gap in the literature on program evaluation in Latin America.
Section 3: Data
Panel data are necessary to study the effects of public expenditures and the relationship between program placement and provincial endowments. We construct the required panel using (Szekely et al. (2000b) ), treatment of missing and zero incomes as well as adjustment for misreporting can change poverty statistics significantly. We abstract from these issues since we use the same source of data for the three years we study, and so assume that in calculating poverty measures, the same benchmark was used across all years. Furthermore, we do not undertake a comparison across poverty measures provided by different sources in this study. However, since the use of different benchmarks could influence poverty statistics as detailed in Szekely et al. (2000b) , our results may only be partially applicable to poverty measures from other sources.
CASEN surveys. These surveys are considered to be nationally and regionally representative.
All other data are collected from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE -National Institute of Statistics).
A brief description of Chile's administrative set-up is warranted. As of early 2007, Chile is divided into 13 regions 6 . Each region is headed by a supervisor appointed by the president.
Regions are numbered 1 through 13 from north to south, with the exception of region 13 (the Metropolitan Region of Santiago) which is located in the center of the country. These 13 regions are sub-divided into 3-7 provinces each, for a total of 51 provinces in the country. Each province is further divided into communes (346 in total) and municipalities (345 in total).
The CASEN surveys differentiate poor households from indigent households. Poor but not indigent households are "those whose incomes do not reach a level to satisfy the basic needs (food and non-food inputs) of (their) In this study, we use provincial data to estimate program impacts. Ideally, we would have liked to use municipal level information which is at a more disaggregate level. However, municipality level data were unavailable for most variables including GDP per capita, price levels, and government spending. Since these variables are key, their absence meant that we had to implement our estimations at a more aggregate level. The basis of analysis in our study is thus the province. Even at the provincial level, poverty data were missing for 4 of the 51 provinces in
Chile. Public spending information was missing for another 2 provinces. Given this, we use data from 45 provinces in our specifications (only 45 of the 51 provinces consistently have all the required data in 2000, 2003, and 2006) . However, the 6 provinces that are excluded (Aisén, Antártica Chilena, Capitán Prat, Coihaique, General Carrera, and Ísla de Pascua) constitute only 0.67% of Chile's total population in the years we consider. Their absence is thus unlikely to strongly influence our results.
Poverty (indigence) rates are calculated using head-count ratios of the number of people in poverty (indigence) relative to the total population. Table 2 also reports that organization rates increased and the consumer price level decreased over the time-span of our study.
Section 4: Analytical Framework
By considering the effect of public health and education expenditures on poverty, we adopt an income-centered approach that values investments in human capital. However, in order to gauge effects correctly, government health and education expenditures need to be estimated jointly. This is because in these data, the correlation between (total and per capita) health and education spending is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (see table 3 ). This correlation necessitates a joint estimation of program effects in order to avoid omitted variable bias (Pitt et al. 2003) .
We develop the province fixed-effects model by considering equation (1) which denotes the relationship between poverty rates, public program expenditures, population characteristics, and other economic indicators of poverty:
(1)
In this equation, P rit is poverty rate r in province i in year t, G jit is a matrix of government spending variables where j denotes a particular type of public spending such as in health services or in education in province i at time t, X j´it is a matrix of exogenous variables where j´ denotes a particular exogenous variable, μ ri is a province-specific time-invariant unmeasured attribute, and ε rit is an independent and identically distributed idiosyncratic error term. θ j and β j´ are parameters to be estimated; θ j measures the effect of government programs.
If governments are responsive to regional attributes, μ ri will be correlated to G jit .
Government investments may be influenced by area characteristics primarily due to two reasons:
(a) given resource constraints, governments are altruistic and invest in regions that have the most potential for high returns (most flood prone, prone to natural disasters, and so on), and (b),
following Becker (1983) , governments are responsive to regional groups and may target investments accordingly (governments respond to demand). The first reason corresponds with governments having compensatory motives in locating programs; the second corresponds with lobbying or pressure-group theories. The discussion in section 2 above suggests that (a) and/or (b) may be at play in determining the level of government spending in Chile. In terms of the estimations, the presence of either (a) or (b) implies that program placement is non-random, that is G jit is not exogenous in equation (1). With the presence of (a) and/or (b), and OLS estimation of equation (1) leads to biased results. This is because the OLS technique ignores the correlation between G jit and μ ri .
The correlation between program placement and area specific unobservables is noted in the following equation:
(2)
This equation shows government spending as a function of E i´´it , a set of exogenous determinants that includes province specific measures, and μ ri , the area specific unobservable. If φ j ≠ 0 in (2), then government expenditures are endogenous in that they are sensitive to province specific characteristics. OLS ignores the correlation between G jit and μ ri by assuming that φ j = 0 in (2), thus leading to biased estimates of θ j in (1).
In what follows, we demonstrate the bias in OLS models. As noted above, the source of the bias is area specific unobservables that influence program placement and the outcomes simultaneously. The presence of these unobservables implies that programs are endogenous, that is, correlated with the error term. OLS models treat program variables exogenously (ignore the presence of the area specific effect in equation (1) 
is used as the dependent variable in the OLS and fixed-effects models reported in the paper. expenditures appears to reduce poverty and indigence, its correlation with the unobserved area specific effect implies that the coefficient on this variable in columns (3) and (6) is biased.
Hence, as a consequence of assuming that program placement is random and thus may be treated exogenously, the method of OLS reaches mistaken conclusions in evaluating the effect of government expenditures. However, when we condition on the non-random placement of programs using province fixed-effects (discussed in detail below), public spending on health and education are found to significantly benefit the poor.
One way of eliminating the influence of the μ ri is to measure and include them directly in equation (1). However, as researchers, we do not know the "rules" that the government may be using in determining the allocation of programs. Thus μ ri cannot be measured directly for inclusion in equation (1). An alternative technique is to eliminate the effect of the μ ri from (1).
Since μ ri are time-invariant, fixed-effects methods may be used to remove their influence in (1). Equation (3) shows the province fixed-effects model where changes in poverty indicators are related to changes in public spending and changes in exogenous characteristics:
The area specific heterogeneity is absent from (3) since it has been differenced out. Given its absence, (3) may be estimated by OLS to gauge the accurate effect of public spending on poverty. These results are discussed below.
Section 5: Results
The main results of this study are shown in table 5, which reports the province fixedeffects estimates in equation (3). We discuss these results in the following sub-sections. Table 5 shows three fixed-effects regressions for each of the two outcomes considered.
Section 5.1: Poverty head-count ratio
Beginning with a model that includes just the program variables (columns (1) and (4)), columns (3) and (6) of table 5 depict results from a model that includes a full set of regressors that are expected to influence poverty and indigence.
9 Columns (2) for the poverty head-count ratio
shows that poverty declines with increases in per capita public spending on health care. The mean value of poverty and indigence in these data is 13.93% and 4.96%, respectively. At these mean values, the estimate in column (2) In terms of the other variables, GDP per capita is a significant determinant of the poverty head-count ratio in column (2). The negative coefficients on GDP per capita in columns (2) and (3) emphasize the importance of economic growth for reducing poverty (the coefficient is measured imprecisely in column (3)). The positive and significant coefficient on prices in column (3) indicates that this variable exacerbates the incidence of poverty. Estimates in column (3) also underline the fact that unemployment and poverty are positively correlated. Finally, a higher percentage of provincial land used for agriculture reduces the poverty head-count ratio.
Agricultural land may proxy for land quality, and better quality land is associated with improved well-being.
Section 5.2: Indigence
9 We include information on GDP per capita at the provincial level in order to proxy for the beneficial impact of economic growth on poverty. We do not have data on economic growth rates at the provincial level.
Columns (4) -(6) of table 5 report results for the indigence head-count ratio. As evident from column (6), per capita public spending on education exerts a strong negative effect on this measure of poverty. From column (6), at the mean value for indigence in these data, a 10,000
pesos (approximately $23) increase in per capita education spending leads to a reduction in the indigence head-count ratio of 0.59%.
Other significant variables in column (6) of table 5 include average education, the consumer price level, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of agricultural land. As expected, an increase in the proportion of agricultural land has a mitigating effect on the indigent head-count ratio. An increase in GDP per capita also has such an effect, although the coefficient on this variable is measured imprecisely. Unexpectedly, and contrary to its effect in column (5),
an increase in average education has a weak positive effect on this measure of extreme poverty.
In keeping with intuition, increases in average prices and the unemployment rate worsen the incidence of indigence in Chile. 
Summary

Section 5.3: Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure
As is well known, head-count ratios measure the incidence of poverty, not their depth or severity. A measure that is sensitive to the severity of poverty is the squared poverty gap index, also known as the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke P 2 (FGT) measure. The FGT is a weighted sum of poverty gaps where the weights are the poverty gaps themselves. One facet of its sensitivity to the depth of poverty is that the FGT measure is responsive to inequality among the poor. Thus for example, a transfer from a less poor to a poor person would reduce the measure, transfers from the poor to the less poor would increase the measure.
In these data, the FGT measure was constructed in the following way. The aim is to measure the severity of poverty in each municipality relative to a provincial level benchmark of welfare in each year. Municipalities are used as the unit of construction since CASEN data at more disaggregate levels may not be reliable (Pizzolito 2005 The mechanics of the construction of the FGT values is as in Foster et al. (1984) . As FGT measures are also bounded by 0 and 1, a log transformation of these measures (similar to the transformation for the poverty and indigence head-count ratios in tables 4 and 5) was undertaken to make the support of the distribution appropriate for the implementation of linear models. The results of the FGT estimations are reported in table 6.
10
The first three columns of table 6 report estimates from an OLS model, the last three columns are the preferred linear fixed-effects models. We focus the discussion of the results on estimates in columns (4) -(6), since these are unbiased for the reasons outlined above. The OLS results are presented only to underline the fact that non-random program placement can confound estimates and lead to inaccurate conclusions. 11 Column (6) of table 6 presents estimates from the inclusion of all variables that may affect the severity of poverty. As evident, the only type of government spending that is found to have a mitigating effect on the depth of poverty is per capita education expenditures. The size of the coefficient on this variable in column (6) indicates that for a 10,000 pesos (about $23) increase in education spending, the FGT 10 We use the average provincial GDP value as the proxy measure for the provincial poverty line. Such a proxy is not constructed for provincial indigence lines, therefore, no separate indigence regressions are reported in table 6. 11 In particular, the OLS model in column (3) mistakenly suggests that government spending on health increases the severity of poverty. Upon comparing this coefficient to its counterpart from the fixed-effects method in column (6), the contrary-to-intuition result of the OLS model is no longer evident. measure declines by 1.53%. In terms of the other variables in column (6), GDP per capita, the rate of organization, average education, and the unemployment rate have the expected signs, but are measured imprecisely. The main unexpected result in columns (4) and (5) of table 6 is the positive and significant effect of per capita health spending. This variable may be picking up the effect of omitted variables that we do not have information on due to data limitations.
Furthermore, contrary to its effect in table 5, the measure of rural population in column (6) appears to exert beneficial effects on the dependent variable. In keeping with intuition, a larger rural population had higher incidences of poverty and indigence in the results of table 5.
However, the estimate for rural population in column (6) of table 6 indicates that the severity of poverty decreases with increases in this variable. Although this appears counter-intuitive, the coefficient may just be reflecting the fact that as compared to urban areas, inequalities amongst the poor are on average lower in rural settings.
Section 5.4: Program placement
In the preceding paragraphs, we discuss and report results from a province fixed-effects approach that treats public programs endogenously. In the following analysis, we shed light on the location rules that may be adopted by the government in determining the placement of programs. This is accomplished by separately estimating Least Squares Dummy Variable In order to study these rules, we aggregated provincial data to the regional level. This was done because estimating LSDV models at the provincial level is expensive in number of parameters, and the underlying matrices would not have been of full rank. were estimated using the regional equivalent of equation (1), and estimates of regional μ ri from 2006 (denoted by μˆr i ) were extracted for use as instruments for the regional μ ri from 2000.
These μˆr i may be interpreted as regional government spending propensities (Pitt et al. 1990 ).
Several studies (Pitt et al. 1990; Menon and Sanyal 2007) show that repeated observations over time on a variable that is measured with error (μ ri ) can be used as instruments as long as the errors are uncorrelated over time. Given that there have been no considerable changes at the regional level between 2000 and 2006, we assume that this is true in our case.
Using future information to explain past decisions, regional μˆr i from 2006 are valid instruments for the regional μˆr i from 2000. Table 7 shows the results of this instrumental variables estimation.
We begin a discussion of the estimates of (2) indicates that with respect to this category of expenditures, the government behaves in a compensatory manner. That is, those regions that have low spending propensities (poor, prone to natural disasters, and so on) are more likely to receive public education assistance. The negative coefficient on instrumented regional effects in column (1) suggests that public health assistance is also likely to be allocated in a compensatory manner; however, this coefficient is measured with error.
In terms of the other variables in table 7, the positive and significant coefficient on GDP per capita in the case of per capita education spending suggests that economic growth facilitates this type of government expenditures. This is as expected since increased government spending may be adequately financed only if the economy is not stagnant. Other estimates in column (2) indicate that as average education at the regional level rises, public spending on education falls. This is as expected since regions with high levels of education already understand the value of literacy. Governments do not need to spend more on education in such areas to demonstrate the importance and value of learning. Regions with greater unionization receive less public education spending -perhaps this coefficient reflects the positive correlation between membership in organized unions and the low-skilled nature of the workforce. Finally, provinces in the southern region of the country attract positive amount of government education expenditures. This may reflect the fact that the southern regions of Chile are on average more poor as compared to the rest of the country.
Section 5.5: Other issues
In this section, we note a few issues that could not be addressed because of data constraints. The first relates to private spending on health care and education. Private spending (NGO sponsored clinics and schools) may complement public spending, particularly in remote provinces where public resources are limited. However, given lack of data on private sources of health and education expenditure at the provincial level in Chile, we cannot separately control for the effects of private spending. This implies that the parameters we measure on public expenditures may be over-estimated, since the public spending variables may absorb the effects of private spending as well. Although some bias may be present, the significance of the variables measuring public investments in table 5 indicates that this bias is likely to be relatively small. That is, even if we included separate measures of private investment in the models of table 5, it is unlikely that the government spending variables would lose their significance in reducing poverty. However, given data limitations, we are unable to corroborate this empirically.
Second, it is possible that public funds intended for certain regions did not reach their anticipated destination because of corruption. Chile, compared to other Latin American nations, has a reasonably respectable record in terms of corruption. Nevertheless, there is still a possibility that public resources were diverted illegally. However, this is a conservative bias. If funds lost due to corruption could be included in our analysis, then the results of our study would be stronger still. This is because such funds are measured in G jit of equation (1), but would not have affected poverty since they were siphoned away before reaching the target population. Corruption implies that a lower level of government spending (than the levels measured in G jit )
had strong beneficial effects on the various indicators of poverty measured in table 5. Without corruption, these effects would have been even more pronounced.
Section 6: Conclusion and Policy Implications
This research examines the impact of government programs on the poor and indigent of
Chile from 2000 to 2006. Results are obtained from a provincial-level panel data set with information on poverty and indigence head-count ratios, the severity of poverty as measured by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) P 2 measure, public spending on health and education programs, and other exogenous variables. Using a province fixed-effects technique to correct for area specific heterogeneity which is correlated with program placement, this study demonstrates that per capita public health and education expenditures significantly reduce the incidence of poverty and indigence in Chile. Estimates indicate that for a 10,000 pesos (about $23) increase in provincial per capita health and education spending, the poverty head-count ratio decreases by 0.48% and 0.73%, respectively. Per capita public spending on education in particular is found to be especially effective in reducing the depth or severity of poverty. Results of this research suggest that for a 10,000 pesos (approximately $23) increase in education spending, the FGT measure declines by 1.53%. Moreover, an evaluation of the "rules" that underlie program placement suggests that public investments in Chile are not randomly distributed -estimates in this study indicate that, in particular, public education investments may be allocated in a compensatory manner. That is, poorly endowed areas are more likely to attract the lion-share of such investments.
This research has important implications for policy. The mitigating effect of public health care and education expenditures on the incidence and severity of poverty suggests that the Chilean government should increase its focus on such spending in order to improve well-being.
There is some indication that this is happening already. Chile Solidario (a government subsidy noted above), enacted in 2002, is a family-centered program designed to reduce the vulnerability associated with conditions of extreme poverty. Families work closely with local agencies for a two-year period to reach a minimum level of subsistence income, and to obtain access to health care, basic social services, and schooling for children (Foxley 2004) . Although this program has been one of the most successful thus far, anecdotal evidence suggests that it still does not provide adequate support for the poor. Participants believe that they would have been more successful if they had been taught the importance of networking with community organizations, and the twoyear association with local agencies is sometimes not long enough for the realization of true benefits.
Chile Solidario is only one of several government programs that has lacked features that would have made them even more useful to the poor. A major problem is that the governments of the Concertación have adopted strategies of fighting poverty that have consistently been However true long-term benefits are absent because of the lack of follow-up support.
Given the results of this paper and the anecdotal evidence presented above, we conclude that the impact of public spending on health care and education may have been even stronger with adequate long-term support. Furthermore, focusing directly on particular problems and assisting specific sub-groups of the population will help improve the efficaciousness of public investments in eliminating poverty.
In addition to direct effects, public spending can lead to substantial positive externalities as well. Private and foreign firms will tend to shy away from investing in regions with poor infrastructure, high levels of poverty, and an illiterate population. This is because the expected return on investments in such regions is low. The Chilean government can invest to make regions more attractive to private and foreign investment. This will have further mitigating effects on poverty through job creation and social development. Hence, in addition to its direct effects on reducing poverty, public spending plays a crucial role in laying the foundation for subsequent private commercial investments that could hasten the pace of poverty eradication.
This research underlines the fact that in addition to GDP growth, targeted government investments in health care and education are important for improving well-being in Chile.
Results of this study indicate that public investments are critical for helping the poor -increasing resources devoted to such investments is thus well-justified. By undertaking a microeconomic study of the effects of public programs in Chile that conditions on the non-randomness of program placement, and by evaluating location rules that may determine the allocation of government expenditures, this research contributes to the literature on program evaluation in Latin America.
Appendix: Construction of the data set
First, prices at the provincial level needed to be constructed. The data available from the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas -National Institute of Statistics) lists monthly prices of 98 food and non-food inputs purchased by a given household. These prices are listed for 24 cities in Chile. To find price levels by province, all provinces were first grouped by region.
Then the 24 provinces that contained a city with price data were assigned that city's price level.
For example, the price level assigned to the province of Arica was the price level of the city of Arica that is located within that province. Next, using the idea that prices tend to be correlated across borders, the remaining provinces' price levels were determined by a weighted average of the physical length of the border that a province had with any other province. Second, data for the government spending variables was compiled by adding the total spending of each municipality within a province to find a province specific value. However, a small number of municipalities did not have data listed for either health or education spending for some of the years we consider. For these municipalities, the value that was assigned was that municipality's (non-missing) value in either the preceding or following year, adjusted for inflation. *Denotes significance at the 90% confidence level; ** significance at 95%; *** significance at 99%. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the regional level in parentheses. Tests for instrument validity are presented in the body of the paper. North region dummy includes the first four regions: Tarapaca, Antofagasta, Atacama, and Coquimbo. South region dummy includes the southern three regions: Los Lagos, Aisen, and Magallanes.
